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STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER 0. ALLEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FEDERATED DAIRY FARMS, INC., 
and ALBERTSON'S, INC., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Appellant 
against Defendants-Respondents for injuries arising from 
a slip and fall accident involving cottage cheese on the 
floor of the Respondent Albertson's store in Roy, Utah, 
in connection with a food demonstration in the store by 
Respondent Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., a/k/a Cream 
0' Weber. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents filed a joint Motion for Summary Judg-
CaseNo. 
13894 
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mant which was granted by the trial Judge and from 
which Appellant appeals. The trial Judge held that there 
was no evidence of negligence on the part of Respon-
dents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment 
and for an order directing that the matter be set for trial 
and tried on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cream 0 ' Weber, a/k/a Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 
contacted the Albertson's store in Roy, Utah, and ar-
ranged for a cottage cheese demonstration in the store 
on March 3, 1973 (R-45 Candland Dep. p. 11). Cream 
0 ' Weber set up the cottage cheese display and hired 
a lady demonstrator to display and push the sale of 
Cream 0' Weber cottage cheese (R-45 Candland Dep. p. 
8 L. 10, p. 4 L. 1). The cottage cheese was Cream 0 ' 
Weber brand and was owned by Albertson's at the time 
of the demonstration (R-45 Candland Dep. p. 8 L, 22, 
p. 9 L. 1). The purpose of the demonstration was to 
promote the sale of Cream 0 ' Weber cottage cheese re-
sulting in a joint profit for Cream 0 ' Weber and Albert-
son's (R-45 Candland Dep. p. 7 L. 5). 
The lady demonstrator placed cottage cheese on 
small one inch square crackers which were then offered 
to adults and children alike (R-46 Blanchard Dep. p. 4 L. 
24, p. 12). 
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The only waste receptacle for unwanted cottage 
cheese was located at the side of the lady demonstrator. 
There were no other waste receptacles placed throughout 
the store for customers to discard unwanted cottage 
cheese (R-46 Blanchard Dep. p. 5 L. 9, Sage Dep. p. 23 
L. 6). After demonstrations of this type, unwanted sam-
ples were found throughout the store on shelves or other 
locations (R-46 Sage Dep. p. 23 L. 9). "Well, wherever 
— after a demo, on the next Monday, when you threw 
freight, you'd find everything anywhere" (R-46 Sage 
Dep. p. 23 L. 14). 
There were no regular clean up or inspection pro-
cedures to look for spills occurring during the demon-
stration (R-46 Sage Dep. p. 9 L. 1, R-45 Candland Dep. 
p. 11 L. 21, p. 13 L. 5). The general policy of the store, 
whether a demonstration was going on or not, was for 
employees to clean up any spills they happen to see 
(R. 46 Sage Dep. p. 6 L. 25). There were no directives to 
employees to make regular rounds of the store to look 
for spills (R-46 Sage Dep. p. 7). 
The floor involved was a beige color linoleum floor 
(R-46 Sage Dep. p. 6 L. 18-23). 
Crackers were selected and used for the cottage cheese 
instead of the safer paper cups because "We try to do 
it on a cracker, or somehting, to make it more tasty" 
(R-45 Candland Dep. p. 10 L. 2).
 m 
The cottage cheese demonstration was located at the 
south end of a food shelf running north and south in the 
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store. The demonstration was also located in the main 
aisle running east and west along the extreme south end 
of the store (R-42 Allen Dep. - diagram). Appellant and 
his wife had entered the store for shopping and had re-
fused to take the cottage cheese sample offered them 
(R-42 Allen Dep. p. 11 L. 17). They then continued 
shopping up and down store aisles (R-42 Allen Dep. p. 
11 L. 23). They later separated in the store with Appel-
lant going to look for the hot roll mixes and his wife 
going to the ice cream counter (R-42 Allen Dep. p. 8 L. 
5). Appellant later walked down an aisle towards the 
south end of the store and as he stepped around 
the south end of the food, shelf, he slipped on a spoonful 
of cottage cheese located on the floor and about one and 
one-half to two feet from the south end of the shelf (R-42 
Allen Dep. p. 13 L. 12, p. 15 L. 1 - 8 ) . Appellant went 
head first into the milk rack located at the back of the 
store (R-42 Allen Dep. p. 13 L. 16). 
Appellant suffered severe injuries to his neck and 
back ultimately resulting in hospitalization and surgery 
for the removal of a disc in his neck and upper back 
(R-42 Allen Dep. p. 25 L. 6 - 14). 
The cottage cheese was located on the floor in the 
south aisle of the store three to five feet away from the 
lady demonstrator (R-43 Allen Dep. p. 5 L. 25, p. 6 L. 
1 - 7, R-42 Allen Dep. p. 13 L. 24, R-46 Blanchard Dep. 
p. 15 L. 20). There was nothing obstructing the view 
of the lady demo from being able to see the cottage 
cheese on the floor (R-46 Sage Dep. p. 17 L. 21). 
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At the time of Appellant's fall, an Albertson's em-
ployee was stocking eggs in the south aisle to the west 
of the fall and approximately ten feet away from the 
cotage cheese on the floor (R-42 Allen Dep. p. 17 L. 9). 
After the fall, there was no cracker found on the 
floor near the cottage cheese indicating that either the 
lady demo spilled some cottage cheese on the floor or a 
patron spilled some and ate the cracker (R-42 Allen Dep. 
p. 16 L. 14, R-43 Allen Dep. p. 6 L. 24). 
The lady demo kept napkins on hand to clean up the 
spills near her (R-46 Blanchard Dep. p. 5 L. 13 - 18). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GENERAL LAW INVOLVED IN THE SUB-
JECT CASE. 
The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by Article 
I §10 of the Constitution of Utah. 
A summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In 
re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P. 2d 683. 
Appellant is entitled to have all of the testimony and 
all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom which tend 
to prove the Appellant's case accepted as true, and all 
conflicts and all evidence which tend to disprove Appel-
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lant's case must be disregarded. Koer v. Mayfair Mar-
kets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P. 2d 666. 
Appellant is entitled! to have the evidence viewed in 
the light most favorable to Appellant together with all 
reasonable inferences. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, supra. 
A store owner is obligated to exercise ordinary care 
to keep the premises reasonably safe for the protection 
of those patronizing his store but he is not an insurer 
of the safety of his customers. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 
supra. 
A store owner may be negligent if he knew, or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of 
any hazardous condition and had a reasonable opportun-
ity to remedy the same. Koer v. Mayfair Markets, supra. 
In Long v. Smith Food King Store, et aL, No. 13252, 
filed October 4, 1973, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
". . . That in order to impose liability for an in-
jury resulting from some foreign substance or de-
fective condition it must have existed for such 
time and manner that in due care the defendant 
either knew or should have known, and remedied 
it; and the variant thereof, that if the condition 
or defect was created by the defendant himself 
or his agents or employees, the notice require-
ment does not apply." 
The recent case of Maugeri v. Great Atlantic and 
Pacific Tea Company, 357 F. 2d 202 (New Jersey 1966), 
involved injuries to a customer in a grocery store who 
fell on some vegetable leaves located on the floor directly 
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in front of produce counters which were slanted racks. 
The Appellate Court observed as follows: 
"At the outset it is imperative that we de-
lineate between two different theories of recov-
ery that may be pursued in a fall-down case 
such as this. The first of these is where the 
conduct of the defendant, in and of itself, cre-
ates a foreseeable risk of harm. In such cases 
actual or constructive notice is not an element 
of proof. The second theory is concerned with 
a condition which arises through no fault of the 
defendant. In these cases the defendant can-
not be held liable unless he had actual or con-
structive notice of the condition. This distinc-
tion becomes meaningul especially where there 
in an intervening act by a third party. Where 
the intervening act is foreseeable the defendant 
remains liable even if he does not have notice of 
the condition created by it" (emphasis added). 
"We believe that when plaintiff has shown 
that the circumstances were such as to create 
the reasonable probability that the dangerous 
condition would occur, he need not also prove 
actual or constructive notice of the specific con-
dition. Factors bearing on the existence of such 
reasonable probability would include the nature 
of the business, the general condition of the prem-
ises, a pattern of conduct or recurring incidents." 
The Court then held that the jury should have been 
permitted to pass on the question as to whether or not 
the defendant was negligent in the manner in which it 
chose to refrigerate, display and sell its produce. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Little 
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v. Butner, 186 Kan. 75, 348 P. 2d 1022 (1960), bad a simi-
lar feet situation to the one at bar. The case involved 
an action by a store customer against a store operator 
and a meat packing company for injuries sustained by a 
customer when she slipped and fell on samples of the 
company's meats which had dropped to the floor after 
being handed to other customers and children in the store 
by a demonstrator. The Supreme Court of Kansas held 
that the trial Court erred in sustaining demurrers of 
defendants. The judgment was reversed and remanded 
for trial. The Court held as follows: 
1. The fact that an injury occurs is not sufficient 
to establish liability and plaintiff cannot recover unless 
he alleges and proves negligence which was the proximate 
cause of the injury. 
2. The customer had the burden of alleging and 
proving a failure to exercise reasonable care for the cus-
tomer's safety and that the damage had been occasioned 
by some breach of duty on the part of the store. 
3. One who enters a retail store for a purpose of 
making a purchase is a business invitee. 
4. One who, as a business invitee, entered a store 
and shopped on the store premises in which groceries 
were displayed for purchase, had every right to assume 
that the floor of the store was suitable and safe to walk 
upon and that she could carry out her purpose without 
injury to herself. 
5. One who engages in business and invites the 
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public to come upon his premises to patronize him^ has 
a duty to use due care to keep in reasonably safe condi-
tion those portions of premises in which the quests or 
customers may be expected to come and go and he will 
be liable to those who, without their own fault, are in-
jured by his failure to do so. The store owner is bound 
to use due care to protect his invitees from injury, not 
only from defects in the premises but also from other 
dangers arising from the use of the premises by himself 
or his licensee. 
6. Where injuries to customers are caused by dan-
gerous conditions negligently created or maintained by 
a proprietor of a business or his servants, proof that the 
proprietor had notice of the dangerous condition is not 
a prerequisite to recovery gainst the proprietor for such 
injuries, since the condition is one which is traceable to 
the proprietor's own act. 
7. "The defendants, by their arrangement or agree-
ment to conduct the demonstration, created a condition, 
the amended petition alleges, whereby they knew or 
should have known that patrons, customers and children 
of tender years would drop particles of meat on the floor 
causing it to become slick and slippery and creating a 
dangerous condition in that area of the store where the 
demonstration was being conducted. These allegations, 
which are admitted by the demurrers, clearly bring the 
instant case within the first class of cases making proof 
of notice unnecessary." 
In Jasko v. F. W. Woolworth Company, 494 P. 2d 
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839 (Colorado 1972), involving injuries to a customer in 
a store who fell on a piece of pizza which was on a ter-
razzo floor in front of a pizza counter, the Supreme Court 
of Colorado observed as follows: 
"Rather, it was her contention that defen-
dant's method of selling pizza was one which 
leads inescapably to such mishaps as her own, 
and that in such a situation conventional notice 
requirements need not be met. We agree. 
"The dangerous condition was created by 
the store's method of sale. The steps taken to 
constantly clean the floors show that the store 
owner recognized the danger. 
"The practice of extensive selling of slices 
of pizza on waxed paper to customers who con-
sume it while standing creates the reasonable 
probability that food will drop to the floor. Food 
on a terrazzo floor will create a dangerous con-
dition. In such a situation, notice to the pro-
prietor of the specific item on the flood need 
not be shown." 
An excellent toeatment of the supermarket slip and 
fall case can be found in 18 U. of Fla. L. Rev. 440, "Super-
market Liability: Problems in Proving the Slip-and-Fall 
Case in Florida." The writer of the article reiterates the 
various avenaues of recovery as follows: 
"(1) that the owner or his employees or 
agents created the dangerous condition, or 
(2) that the owner or his employees or 
agents had actual notice of the dangerous con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dition and sufficient time in which to remedy 
it, or 
(3) that the condition existed long enough 
to have been discovered and remedied (con-
structive notice).99 
At page 442 of the article, the writer quotes from 
the late Justice Terrell wherein the Justice urged that 
"rules of conduct governing a business are not rules of 
statute that the legislature is expected to promulgate, 
they are rules of reason that emanate from the court and 
which the court is expected to keep current." The article 
then explores various fact situations which were held to 
be jury questions by virtue of the store keepers alleged 
negligent method of operation. 
In the Conclusion portion of the article at page 455 
the following is found: 
"There can be no doubt that recovery in a 
supermarket slip--and-fall case is a sometime 
thing. The avenues to recovery are blockaded 
at some points, poorly lighted at others, and vir-
tually nonexistent at still others. 
"Why should these burdens be placed upon 
the plaintiff who is injured in a supermarket? 
The answers *$&& not satisfactory. We cannot 
assume that most slip-and-fall cases are fraudu-
lent. Nor can we believe that most shoppers are 
careless. Most certainly, we cannot proclaim that 
the burden of proof must be what it is because 
the supermarket is just another piece of busi-
ness property. 
"It is precisely because the supermarket is 
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not just another business property that so many 
slip-and-fall cases occur on its premises. And 
it is this same reason that largely accounts for 
the extreme difficulty in proving a supermarket 
slip-and-fall case. Very few, if any, of the other 
business properties combine the following: 
(1) hard and comparatively slick floors, 
(2) push carts, 
(3) the same weekly, predominantly fe-
male, clientele, 
(4) eye-catdiing displays, 
(5) large numbers of small and potentially 
hazardous items in open bins, 
(6) almost continuous replenishment of 
products, 
(7) customer unassisted handling of pro-
ducts, 
(8) relatively high volume of persons on 
property each day, 
(9) well-defined shopping flow, 
(10). high proportion of part-time help, and 
other features that distinguish the modern self-
service supermarket." 
The writer continues at page 456: 
"From our study, the law governing super-
market liability can be criticized for its incon-
sistency, reliance on chance modes of proof, and 
frequent denial of relief without jury considera-
tion. The existing law would seem to prefer 
that a sizable number of valid claims are de-
nied relief than to allow even the possibility 
that an unjust claim would sneak through. A 
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rethinking of supermarket liability is certainly 
desirable/' 
And further at page 457: 
"Whether this particular solution is adopted 
is not the main issue, however. The larger issue 
is whether outdated concepts of liability and 
proof will be allowed to continue in the super-
market setting. In Justice Terrell's words: 'In 
light of the disparity between the modern food 
market and the old time grocery, it is out of the 
question to contend that they are governed by 
the same rules of care.'" 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENTS' OWN CONDUCT CRE-
ATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION 
AND REASONABLY FORESEEABLE RISK 
WHICH CAUSED APPELLANT'S FALL 
AND SUBSEQUENT INJURY AND AC-
TUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE IS 
UNNECESSARY. 
Respondents were negligent in serving the cottage 
cheese on small crackers one inch square instead of in 
the much safer paper cups. It was foreseeable that cot-
tage cheese on crackers served to adulte and children 
would find its way to the floor of the store. The only 
answer of Respondents is that the crackers made the 
sample more "tasty." 
Respondents were negligent in not providing waste 
receptacles throughout the store for children and adults 
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who did not desire to eat the cottage cheese sample and 
desired to dispose of the same. 
Respondents were negligent in not providing for 
regular inspections of the store floor during the demon-
stration since it was foreseeable that during a demon-
stration of this type cottage cheese would likely be spilled 
on the floor causing a very slippery and hazardous con-
dition. 
Respondent Cream 0 ' Weber had an employee within 
three to five feet from the cottage cheese sample and 
Respondent Albertson's had an employee within ten 
feet of the cottage cheese sample at the time of the fall. 
Respondents were negligent in not seeing the sample on 
the floor and cleaning it up. 
The lady demonstrator was within three to five feet 
from the cottage cheese sample and because of this close 
proximity, it is a jury question as to whether or not she 
spilled the sample herself or whether someone else spilled 
it and she should have seen it and cleaned it up. 
POINT III. 
RESPONDENTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN 
THAT THEY HAD CONSTRUCTIVE NO-
TICE OF THE COTTAGE CHEESE SAM-
PLE ON THE FLOOR. 
Respondent Cream 0 ' Weber's lady demonstrator 
was within three to five feet away from the cottage cheese 
sample and defendant Albertson's had an employee ten 
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feet away from the sample with no obstructions between 
said employees and the sample. It is a jury question 
whether or not defendants had constructive notice of said 
sample and whether they should have cleaned it up prior 
to Appellant's fall. 
In the argument of the subject case in the trial Court, 
Respondents relied heavily on the case of Long v. Smith 
Food King Store, et a/., supra. This case is very similar 
to the case at bar except for the following factual differ-
ences: 
1. It is more likely that the pumpkin pie samples 
in the Long case would be eaten more readily by the 
store patrons, especially children, than the cottage cheese 
cheese samples making it more likely that more cottage 
cheese would find the floor than the pumpkin pie. This 
would be particularly so without waste receptacles pro-
vided throughout the store. 
2. In the Long case, the plaintiff was in a different 
aisle than the lady demonstrator and in the case at bar 
Appellant was in the same aisle with the lady demon-
strator approximaitely three feet away from where she 
was serving the cottage cheese samples and with no 
visual obstructions. 
Also, with utmost respect for this high Court, there 
is still a profound question as to whether or not the Long 
v. Smith Food King Store, et al, case was a "notice" case 
or one involving the primary negligence of the defendants 
in the method in which they conducted the food demon-
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stration. It is hoped that the additional legal authorities 
cited in the subject brief will assist the Court in a pos-
sible modification of the ratio decidendi in the Long case. 
It is one thing to have a grape drop out of a shop-
ping basket and the requirement of notice before liability 
attaches to the store keeper, and quite another when a 
store keeper embarks on a special sales demonstration 
which increases the reasonably foreseeable risks to the 
safety of the customers without taking any additional 
precautions. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that he is entitled 
to a jury trial on the issues of Respondents' primary negli-
gence in failing to serve the cottage cheese in paper cups 
instead of on one inch crackers, in failing to provide ad-
ditional waste receptacles throughout the store, in failing 
to make regular inspections of the floor area during the 
day of the demonstration and in Respondents' failure 
to clean up the cottage cheese even though their em-
ployees were stationed in very close proximity to it. 
Appellant further submits that actual or construc-
tive notice of this condition was not required in this situa-
tion. However, it is clear that Respondents had con-
structive notice of the cottage cheese sample because of 
its close proximity to the lady demonstrator and the other 
store employee. 
Appellant further urges this high Court that when 
it considers the balancing of social interests between the 
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store patrons and the store keeper, the reasonable fore-
seeability of the risks involved in such a demonstration, 
and the severe and permanent injuries that continue to 
occur in supermarkets, that the thrust of the legal prin-
ciples enunciated will have the effect of justice to all 
parties as well as making supermarkets safer places for 
customers to venture into while acquiring the staples of 
life. 
If a store decided to demonstrate a new type of 
thumbtack by distributing the tacks to children and 
adults alike and with no precautions taken to guard 
against the tacks being dropped on the floor, we would 
be horrified because of the likelihood that many people 
would step on the tacks receiving puncture wounds in 
their feet. However, it is ironic that food dropped on 
hard floor surfaces usually causes greater injuries than 
do thumbtacks. The thumbtack injury would require a 
tetanus shot and result in a routine recovery in most 
cases. The slip and fall cases involving food on hard floors 
frequently result in sundry fractures and severe perma-
nent injuries. 
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the action of the trial Court and remand the case for 
trial on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD H. THORNLEY 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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